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COMPETING POLICIES IN
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas'
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District recently decided
Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc. v. Douglas,' which upheld the circuit court's
refusal to enforce a covenant not to compete. The resolution of Showe-Time
required balancing the policies of fostering contractual freedom and of encour-
aging competition.3 This Note will discuss freedom of contract in the context
of covenants not to compete and conclude that the Showe-Time court did not
give sufficient weight to individuals' contractual freedom and erred in not en-
forcing the covenant.
The facts of the case are simple. The Douglases operated a small grocery
store, and Showe-Time rented video cassettes.' The contract between them
called for Showe-Time to place video cassettes in the Douglas' store.5 The
Douglases were to manage the rentals and retain thirty percent of the receipts,
with the remainder going to Showe-Time. 6 The contract was terminable at will
by either party7 and contained the following covenant against competition:
It is hereby agreed between the parties that if this agreement is terminated
for any reason with or without cause, that [the Douglases] shall be prohibited
from engaging in, assisting in, organizing, managing or having any interest
whatsoever in, any movie tape rental, sales or service or any vcr or vcp sales,
service or rental for a period of TWO (2) years within the county limits of
Butler County, Missouri."
Upon commencement of the contract, Showe-Time advertised the availability
of its movies at the Douglas' store,9 thereby establishing a customer base. Af-
ter thirteen months, Showe-Time terminated the agreement, according to the
1. 727 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
2. Id.
3. Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1973).
4. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 427.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The provision read:
This agreement shall continue in full force and effect until such time as either
party shall notify the other party in writing, giving TWO (2) days' notice of
their intention to terminate this agreement. Upon the termination of this
agreement by either party as set out above, [the Douglases] shall within ONE
(1) day of said termination return all outstanding tapes and records to
SHOWE-TIME.
Id.
8. Id. at 427-28.
9. Id. at 428.
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terms of the contract, due to the low profitability of the operation.' 0 After
termination, the Douglases purchased their own movies and went into competi-
tion with other Showe-Time outlets in the county."' Showe-Time sought an
injunction to prevent the violation of the covenant not to compete. 2 The trial
court denied the injunction and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that
where "the party in whose favor the covenant runs terminates the arrangement
without good cause, enforcement by injunction is not so clearly established.""
This ruling is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the parties as
they entered the contract. As such, the Showe-Time decision is a marked de-
parture from Missouri's commitment to freedom of contract and is detrimental
to both economic efficiency and contractual reliance.
The strongest argument supporting contractual freedom posits that eco-
nomic efficiency and value maximization are increased when individuals are
allowed to determine which agreements will maximize their well being. These
benefits are realized, however, only when the parties can expect that those
agreements will be enforced.14 In determining whether to enforce a contract,
Posner states "[t]he economic test . . . is whether the imposition of liability
will create incentives for value maximizing conduct in the future."" "If a rule
of contract law is inefficient, whatever its noneconomic merits, the parties will
simply contract around it; if forbidden to do so, there will be a price
adjustment."' 6
Showe-Time does not allow parties to take advantage of a promise of
future noncompetition so as to achieve the present benefit of lower prices or -
as here - greater rental profits. Had the Douglases not been able to contract
away their right to future competition, Showe-Time likely would have either
required a higher percentage of the rents or perhaps would not have even en-
tered into an arrangement. Without the noncompetitive agreement, Showe-
Time would risk losing established customers by directing them to the
Douglases yet would be unprotected if the rental arrangement turned out to be
unsuccessful. In either case, the Douglas' present value would have been di-
minished, and accordingly the arrangement would have led to economic
inefficiency.
Posner argues that a court is not as well equipped as the parties to a
contract to determine what terms are reasonable.' 7 In other words, he believes
there is a presumption that the parties will reach an agreement that maxi-
mizes values for themselves. Any court action to change that agreement is
10. Id. There was no evidence indicating that the Douglases failed to turn over
receipts due Showe-Time. Id. at 428-29.
11. Id. at 428.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 433 (emphasis in original).
14. R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 65-100 (2d ed. 1977).
15. Id. at 68.
16. Id. at 87.
17. Id. at 70-71.
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presumed economically inefficient. However, if this presumption can be rebut-
ted without inquiry into the reasonableness of the contract terms, then the
court should not enforce those terms.18 Posner concludes, however, that
"[e]conomic analysis, at least, reveals no grounds other than fraud, incapacity,
and duress ... for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he made in
entering into the contract."1 9
In contrast to the very limited inquiry called for by Posner, the Showe-
Time court apparently determined that it was unreasonable for the Douglases
to risk future opportunities in attempting to maximize present profits in their
relationship with Showe-Time. The Douglases explicitly agreed not to compete
for two years after termination.20 Relying on that promise, Showe-Time sup-
plied the Douglases with movies and advertising to promote those movies to
both the general public and established Showe-Time customers.2 Because the
court refused to enforce the covenant, Showe-Time lost a part of its bargain
and risks losing pre-existing customers. More fundamentally, however, the
court's refusal to enforce the covenant fails to respect the parties' superior
ability to structure business arrangements that maximize both their individual
profits and general economic efficiency.
Missouri courts' historical protection of individual contractual freedom
provides another argument that favors enforcement of the covenant. Sanger v.
Yellow Cab Co. 2 2 discussed freedom of contract in the context of a release in a
personal injury case:
[i]t is the policy of the law to encourage freedom of contract and the peaceful
settlement of disputes. A person under no disability and under no compulsion
may convey his property or relinquish his rights for as small consideration as
he may decide. To hold otherwise, while it would relieve the instant appellant
of the effects of a bad bargain, would establish a harmful precedent not only
as to personal injury claims, but as to contracts in general. Such a policy
would make it difficult to settle controversies respecting damages to persons or
property without resort to the courts.23
In refusing to enforce the Douglas-Showe-Time covenant not to compete, the
Southern District Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish two Missouri
cases which support the policy of freedom of contract in the context of cove-
nants not to compete. 24
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id. at 87; see also Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
20. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 427-28.
21. Id. at 428.
22. 486 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. 1972) (en banc); see also Landmark N. County Bank
& Trust Co. v. National Cable Training Centers, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987); Christeson v. Burba, 714 S.W.2d 183, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Dewitt v.
Lutes, 581 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
23. Sanger, 486 S.W.2d at 480 (quoting Vondera v. Chapman, 352 Mo. 1034,
1039, 180 S.W.2d 704, 705-06 (1944)).
24. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 432.
19881
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First, in American Pamcor, Inc. v. Klote" plaintiff terminated the de-
fendant's employment without cause26 yet the court upheld a covenant prohib-
iting solicitation of the plaintiff's customers. 27 The Showe-Time court distin-
guished American Pamcor upon the grounds that the nonsolicitation
agreement in American Pamcor was narrower than the noncompetition agree-
ment in Showe-Time.28 But this distinction ignores the breadth which the
American Pamcor court gave the agreement. That court found that by the
mere act of sending his salesmen "into the forbidden territory" and accepting
orders the defendant had breached the covenant.2 9 The defendant argued his
termination without cause should bar enforcement of the agreement.30 In rein-
forcing Missouri's commitment to freedom of contract the court stated
"[h]owever appealing that argument may be, it does not free us from follow-
ing the maxim that equity follows the law. We must accord the parties their
lawful rights as they set those rights by their contract." 31
The second case the Showe-Time court distinguished is Willman v.
Beheler.32 In Willman, Dr. Willman hired Dr. Beheler to work in his medical
practice.33 When they became partners, Beheler agreed that if he left the part-
nership "voluntarily or involuntarily ... he [would] not practice medicine for
a period of 5 years" in the same area.3 Willman later terminated the partner-
ship without cause.33 The Missouri Supreme Court refused to enforce the cov-
enant by injunction but rather directed the lower court to determine and
award money damages.36 The Showe-Time court found this remedial distinc-
tion adequate to negate the applicability of Willman to the Douglas-Showe-
Time dispute.
But this ignores the fact that the Supreme Court determined in Willman
that the agreement was enforceable in equity. The court simply refused to
equitably enforce the agreement because the original five year period had ex-
pired. It thus felt money damages would be more appropriate than the imposi-
tion of an injunction beyond the date called for in the contract.37 The Willman
court honored the freedom of contract more than did the Showe-Time court.
Basically, the Showe-Time court did not enforce the contract because Showe-
Time terminated without cause.38 Yet the Willman court stated that "[u]nder
25. 438 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969).
26. Id. at 289.
27. Id. at 291.
28. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 432.
29. American Pamcor, Inc., 438 S.W.2d at 291.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973).
33. Id. at 773.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 774.
36. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 432.
37. Willman, 499 S.W.2d at 777-78.
38. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 434.
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this contract it was not necessary for Willman to show that he had good cause
... to dissolve the partnership. The partnership agreement contained no such
requirement as a precondition to dissolution and none will be read into the
contract by judicial construction."3 9 This statement clearly indicates that Mis-
souri law would allow the termination of an arrangement without cause and
still enforce a covenant not to compete. Both the Willman and American Pam-
cor, Inc. decisions provide a solid basis of freedom of contract that outweighs
the competing policy of encouraging competition. The Showe-Time court
should have given more weight to this policy and enforced the contract as the
parties had agreed.
In Christeson v. Burba,'40 Judge Crow, who wrote the opinion in Showe-
Time, stated that "the policy of the law is to let the parties weigh the benefits
pro and con and to leave them free to make whatever contract between them-
selves that they please."'41 He also stated that "[t]he general rule of freedom
of contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain."'42 Yet this policy was
not even mentioned in the Showe-Time case. The remainder of this Note will
explore possible explanations for the exclusion of consideration of this policy
by the Willman court, and conclude that none of them are satisfactory.
One reason for not enforcing the covenant, though not explicitly men-
tioned in the opinion, is that the contract may have seemed so harsh that the
court treated it as an unconscionable adhesion contract. Refusal to enforce the
contract on the basis of its being an adhesion contract falls under the category
of procedural unconscionability. 41 Professor Kronman describes an adhesion
contract as one where "there is a striking imbalance in the bargaining power
of the parties to a contract, so that one is able to dictate terms to the other
.... 144 This description does not fit the facts of this case. While Showe-
Time is larger than the Douglas' store, they are both business operations and
should be treated as such. It would be difficult to say that Showe-Time was in
an unfair or superior bargaining position. Further, in the context of an em-
ployment contract, the court of appeals has indicated that to preclude enforce-
39. Willman, 499 S.W.2d at 776.
40. 714 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
41. Id. at 195 (citing Hathman v. Waters, 586 S.W.2d 376, 385 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979)).
42. Id.
43. In referring to unconscionability under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
doctrine is described as follows:
[A] distinction is made between "substantive" and "procedural" unconsciona-
bility. By substantive unconscionability is meant an undue harshness in the
contract terms themselves. On the other hand, procedural unconscionability in
general is involved with the contract formation process, and focuses on high
pressure exerted on the parties, fine print of the contract, misrepresentation,
or unequal bargaining position.
Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 624, 634 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1979).
44. Kronman, supra note 19, at 770.
1988]
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ment of an agreement as an adhesion contract, one must show that the offeree
had no choice but to accept the agreement. 45 In Showe-Time, there is no indi-
cation that the Douglases were in that type of situation in accepting Showe-
Time's offer. In fact, after the relationship was terminated, the Douglases
bought their own movies and rented them to the public. 6 They did "have a
real choice" whether or not to sign the contract.47
Another possible argument against enforcement of the Showe-Time-
Douglas covenant is that if the Douglases had read and understood the con-
tract, they would never have signed it. This argument would fit the category of
substantive unconscionability. 48 One commentator, in describing this type of
unconscionability, stated:
[v]ery speculative contracts which turn out badly, involving substantial loss,
nearly always look foolish and unfair to the person who has lost. And his
predicament will often attract the sympathy of third parties who may feel
that the other party to the transaction has not really deserved his gains.49
This appearance of unfairness and the resultant sympathy, however, is not suf-
ficient reason for refusing to enforce the contract as entered. "[O]ne who signs
a paper, without reading it, if he is able to read and understand, is guilty of
such negligence in failing to inform himself of its nature that he cannot be
relieved from the obligation contained in the paper thus signed. ... " The
policy of freedom of contract should prevail over the court's sympathy for the
Douglases.
The strongest reason, and the one this court relied on, for overcoming the
policy of contractual freedom is the opposing policy favoring competition and
narrow construction of restraints on trade.5' Missouri, however, historically
has placed a greater emphasis on contractual freedom, as opposed to the policy
against restraint of trade, than did the Showe-Time court.52 Generally, for a
covenant against competition to be enforceable, it "must serve a proper inter-
est of the employer in protecting the good will of a business, and must be
reasonably limited in time and space."5 3 The covenant in Showe-Time appears
45. USA Chem., Inc. v. Lewis, 557 S.W.2d 15, 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
46. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 428.
47. "[T]he purchaser who is offered a printed contract on a take it or leave it
basis does have a real choice: he can choose to refuse to sign, knowing that if better
terms are possible another seller will offer them to him." R. POSNER, supra note 14, at
85.
48. See supra note 43.
49. P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 82 (1979).
50. Sanger v. Yellow Cab Co., 486 S.W.2d 477, 481 (Mo. 1972) (en banc)
(quoting Higgins v. American Car Co., 324 Mo. 189, 193, 22 S.W.2d 1043, 1044
(1929)).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186, 188 (1979).
52. Willman v. Beheler, 499 S.W.2d 770 (Mo. 1973); American Pamcor, Inc. v.
Klote, 438 S.W.2d 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969). For an in-depth treatment of Willman
and American Pamcor, Inc., see supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
53. Osage Glass, Inc. v. Donovan, 693 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). The
[Vol. 53
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to meet all of these elements. The interest that Showe-Time was seeking to
protect was erosion of its customer base.54 This interest is sufficient for en-
forcement of the covenant. 5 The time and space restrictions also appear to be
reasonable.5 6 The Douglases were only restricted for two years and only within
Butler County. 7 Reasonableness, and correspondingly enforcement, further
depends on the public not being harmed. 58 The covenant against competition
in Showe-Time would have little effect on the public, as there were several
other video cassette outlets in the county.59 The supply of cassettes and the
number of competitors in the county would not be substantially reduced by
enforcement of the covenant. The reason the covenant was not enforced boils
down to the court not recognizing the freedom of the Douglases to agree not to
compete after termination of the relationship without cause in exchange for
Showe-Time's commitments under the contract.
In reaching its conclusion the court principally relied on the Massachu-
origins of this reasonableness standard have been explained as follows:
Covenants of the kind here involved, being in restraint of trade, were first
regarded by the courts as contrary to public policy and hence invalid. The
reason for such rule was two fold, namely, injury to the public and injury to
the employee. The restraint worked injury to the public by depriving it of the
industry to which the employee was best suited, and tended to cast the em-
ployee and his family upon the public for support. It also fostered monopolies,
prevented competition, and tended to raise prices .... The doctrine had its
origins at a time when the field of human enterprise was limited, and each
man's activity was necessary to the material welfare of his community. Travel
was difficult, and the conditions of the times were unfavorable to the migra-
tion of persons seeking employment .... But with improved facilities of travel,
and the growing ability of workers to adapt themselves to different applica-
tions, the reason for the rule disappeared, with the result that the courts be-
gan to uphold reasonable restraints on employment on the theory that such
covenants were beneficial to both parties-being beneficial to the employee
for the reason that it enabled him to dispose of his services advantageously,
and beneficial to the employer because it protected him against a competition
which would not otherwise have existed except for the employment.
Renwood Food Prods., Inc. v. Schaefer, 240 Mo. App. 939, 951, 223 S.W.2d 144, 150-
51 (1949).
54. See Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 428.
55. Osage Glass, Inc., 693 S.W.2d at 75.
56. See generally Osage Glass, Inc. v. Donovan, 693 S.W.2d at 71 (upholding
covenant not to compete for 3 years in employment contract); Willman v. Beheler, 499
S.W.2d at 770 (upholding covenant not to compete for 5 years within a 20 mile radius
of the city limits); Herrington v. Hall, 624 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding covenant not to compete for 3 years within a 10 mile radius); R.E. Harring-
ton, Inc. v. Frick, 428 S.W.2d 945, 950-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (upholding covenant
not to compete for 3 years in any state in which the employer did business); Prentice v.
Rowe, 324 S.W.2d 457, 463 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (upholding covenant not to compete
for 2 years within the large service area).
57. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 432.
58. See supra note 53.
59. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 434.
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setts case of Economy Grocery Stores Corp. v. McMenamy" and the Texas
case of Security Services, Inc. v. Priest.1 Each refused to enforce covenants
not to compete. Both, however, are distinguishable from Showe-Time. In
Economy Grocery, an employee was terminated without cause under an em-
ployment at will contract.62 The court refused to enforce the noncompetition
covenant. 63 This result in Economy Grocery, however, did not frustrate the
intentions of the parties to the contract in that the agreement provided for
noncompetition if the relationship was terminated "voluntarily or involunta-
rily."'64 The contract was silent on whether it was applicable to a termination
without cause. In other words, a termination may be voluntary or involuntary
regardless of whether it is with or without cause. In Showe-Time, the contract
specifically said that the noncompetition agreement would be applicable if the
"agreement is terminated for any reason with or without cause." 5 Security
Services, Inc. is distinguishable because, in addition to the fact that there was
no cause for termination of the relationship, there was also proof that the
plaintiff acted in bad faith in entering into the contract in that he intended to
only hire the defendant for long enough to obtain his customer contacts and
then discharge him.66 In contrast, there is no proof of bad faith on the part of
Showe-Time in entering into the arrangement. In fact, the relationship contin-
ued for thirteen months before Showe-Time terminated it.67
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Williams in Security Services,
Inc. is also of interest. Hz stated:
I concur only in the result reached by the majority. In my opinion the judg-
ment should be affirmed on the sole ground that plaintiff has failed to present
sufficient evidence that defendant's admitted competitive endeavors have dam-
aged plaintiffs business so as to justify the issuance of an injunction....
However, I wish to disassociate myself from the remainder of the major-
ity opinion. The record reveals that the parties entered into a perfectly legal
contract which gave each the right to terminate the same without cause. I fail
to see any issue concerning cancellation of the contract. I cannot accept the
admitted dicta in cases from other states which attempt to weaken the estab-
lished law in Texas dealing with contracts that include covenants against
competition.6 8
This statement reflects Justice Williams' view that freedom of contract is be-
ing dishonored by the decision in Security Services, Inc.. In adopting the opin-
ions of these two courts, the Southern District Court of Appeals has under-
60. 290 Mass. 549, 195 N.E. 747 (1935).
61. 507 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
62. Economy Grocery Stores Corp., 290 Mass. at 551, 195 N.E. at 748.
63. Id. at 553, 195 N.E. at 749.
64. Id. at 550, 195 N.E. at 747.
65. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 427.
66. Security Servs., Inc., 507 S.W.2d at 593, 595.
67. Showe-Time Video Rentals, Inc., 727 S.W.2d at 428.
68. Security Servs., Inc., 507 S.W.2d at 596 (Williams, C.J., concurring).
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mined Missouri's clearly established policy of contractual freedom.69
When individuals no longer have confidence that the parties with whom
they deal will be forced to stand by their promises, they have no incentive to
enter contracts establishing economically efficient arrangements. Such a lack
of incentive discourages the combination of capital so as to accomplish objec-
tives which are individually unattainable. The result is both individual and
societal injury. Such injury should weigh in a court's decision not to enforce a
freely entered contract. In Showe-Time, however, it was ignored.
LAWRENCE G. DORROH
69. See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
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